

Beyond Inclusion: Rethinking Rhetoric's Historical Narrative

Karma R. Chávez

In this paper, the author reconsiders the historical narrative of Rhetorical Studies as a citizenship narrative and thus argues that much rhetorical theory works to uphold the value and ideal of citizenship, while often ignoring or reframing appeals that challenge the very bases of citizenship and the nation-state. This account of Rhetoric's intellectual history reveals the very parameters for what deserves attention in disciplinary history. The author suggests that this account also reveals the necessity to break from that history, not in order that Rhetoric become more inclusive but so that Rhetoric may be something entirely different, something constituted through non-normative, non-citizen, non-Western perspectives and ways of knowing and being.

Keywords: Citizenship; Intellectual History; Feminism; Inclusionary Politics; Rhetorical Theory

Crafting intellectual history is always precarious. Toward what ends do we seek our intellectual history on the 100th anniversary of our flagship journal? Is it really true, for instance, that *we* would not be “here” without the scholarship of those who are said to constitute our history, as Raymie McKerrow implies? For scholars such as myself (queer, Chican@, feminist, radical), there is much more evidence of those who came before writing in such a way as to foreclose the possibility of my scholarly existence than to enable it. Although it is important to know one's history so as not to repeat the errors of the past or fail to give due credit, might it not be the case that history also functions as a disciplining mechanism? As McKerrow rightly notes, our field has been dominated by a perspective that belongs unambiguously to Western, white, heterosexual, physically and mentally able, educated, cisgender, citizen men in Europe and the United States. They are both the subjects and objects of rhetorical scholarship.

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As McKerrow argues in an earlier essay, rhetoric “constitutes an *administrative rhetoric*—it concerns itself with the distribution of resources necessary for the maintenance or alteration of power.”¹ These deeply entrenched biases already have been highlighted by feminist, queer, critical race, postcolonial and decolonial scholars, among others;² that our field is constituted through the dominant norms that McKerrow and others have identified certainly deserves further attention. However, I want to offer another way to understand Rhetoric’s intellectual history: as a citizenship *narrative*.

In an astute essay, Amy L. Brandzel maintains that history has been used to discipline the field of Women’s Studies by suggesting that there is a single subject of feminist history at its center: “the whitenormative citizen-woman.”³ In my view, we make less bones about this in Rhetoric: the many white men and the handful of women who have taken it upon themselves to tell our history are more or less unabashed about the fact that a primary concern in rhetoric is to examine and enhance citizens’ discourses. From traditional studies of public address, to an array of social movement studies, to analyses of democratic deliberation and the public sphere, Rhetoric scholars are concerned almost exclusively with citizen discourses, mostly from white men in *public*. Of course, some of us have written of women, people of color, indigenous folks, and immigrants, too. But even in those cases, many of which explore how the marginalized petition the State for recognition or redress, the study of rhetoric in the main is the study of people appealing to/for citizenship. Consequently, most of the rhetorical theory and criticism published in the field takes the value and ideal of citizenship for granted, ignoring altogether or, at best, reframing appeals that challenge the very bases of citizenship and the nation-state. In my view, it is imperative that we break from that history, not in order that Rhetoric may become a more inclusive discipline but so that it may become something entirely different: a discipline constituted through non-normative, non-citizen, non-Western perspectives and ways of knowing and being.

This is not another essay about Rhetoric’s history of exclusions. This is an essay about our field’s long standing investment in the normative formation of citizenship, and how even the postmodern turn has not shifted that master narrative. Therefore, over its course I explain why widening the scope or including more voices in our history is not the answer, and I instead identify three key pieces of scholarship that may serve as important touchstones as we imagine alternatives to the citizenship discourses that to this point has oriented our discipline’s history.

The Quest for Citizenship

Rhetoric’s embeddedness in citizenship is so ubiquitous as to be taken for granted, in part because of our preoccupation with the public and political realms. Studies of public address have by and large centered on “great speeches” by politicians and other significant citizens of Western nation-states. As the discipline has considered public discourses more broadly, we have turned attention to the civic practices of ordinary citizens, many of whom demand inclusion in state and national formations in innovative ways (i.e., advocates of same-sex marriage or military inclusion of

women, gays and lesbians) or attempt to broaden the image of who a citizen is and what citizenship can be (i.e., immigrant activists who name themselves “undocumented Americans”). Kenneth Rufo and Jarrod Atchison write, “In the last decades and change, the citizen has appeared on the pages of rhetoric’s most influential journals with the regularity of a close friend or neighbor stopping over for a visit or borrowing flour.”⁴ In their review of the casualness and lack of specificity in recent deployments of the “citizen” in rhetorical scholarship, the authors note that (ordinary) citizens are usually figured as separate from state agents and the government, as well as distinct from others such as journalists, activists, scholars and politicians. They note that the term has been under-theorized and over-utilized because “the figure of the citizen seems more intuitive and more agile than do terms like subject or agency.”⁵ Their concern is with how our preoccupation with citizens and their political actions in the forms of multiple kinds and modes of citizenship over-extends the realm of the political. In our compulsory promotion of political engagement, we issue a normative claim about what rhetoric does (educates the citizenry and helps citizens to promote their interests) and the relationship between the citizen and the political.⁶

While Rufo and Atchison laud my colleague Robert Asen’s “discourse theory of citizenship” for offering one of the first serious theoretical explanations and engagements with the elusive concepts of citizenship and the citizen, they lament the expansiveness of Asen’s theory, asking, “what step could one take that would possibly not qualify as one of citizenship’s many modes of engagement?”⁷ Suggesting that Asen creates only two ways of understanding citizenship—“as a citizen’s process” or “as the citizen’s possession”—they offer a third way:

the citizen as the possession of citizenship, to see in citizenship a certain juridical, social, and political determination that stamps the subject as a subject *qua* citizen, that imposes upon subjectivity the obligation toward public engagement and one’s incorporation into the political.⁸

Unlike Rhetoric, which plays fast and loose with the concept (Asen is, after all, their representative for the field writ large), their view of citizenship delimits the political. Such a limitation is important to Rufo and Atchison so that we don’t arrive at a fascist end, where upon the private and the public are collapsed and there is no outside to the political.

I don’t wish to debate Rufo’s and Atchison’s bounded conception of the political, but I do share their concern about the excessive use of and reliance upon citizenship in Rhetoric for what it obscures and implies about whose rhetorical practices are worthy of engagement, whose rhetorical practices can serve as the material basis for our rhetorical theory, and what modes of rhetorical practice as well as rhetorical theory and criticism *matter*. As I argue in my monograph *Queer Migration Politics*, for nearly three decades outside of Rhetoric and for roughly two decades within, scholars have identified numerous kinds of citizens that, in some instances, have very little relation to citizenship as a legal designation.⁹ A decade earlier, anthropologist Aihwa Ong wrote about “cultural citizenship,”¹⁰ a term that, something akin to Asen’s discourse theory, has become popular shorthand for civic, community, and

activist practices that may or may not have anything to do with a legal and administrative designation.¹¹ Others like Toby Miller and Renato Rosaldo have named sexual citizenship, social citizenship, consumer citizenship, and cosmopolitan citizenship, among others. The concern in my book and here is with what happens when we situate all subject formation and civic, community and activist practices within the framework of citizenship, a framework that cannot be divorced from its connection to state surveillance and control more generally, and its relation with the modern nation-state specifically. Since the thirteenth century, "citizenship" has referred to many practices and types of belonging, but in modern times it has referred almost entirely to those connected to governing polities, particularly nation-states. The *OED* tells us that, foremost, citizenship is "the position or status of being a citizen,"¹² and the sense in which citizen is meant is as "a legally recognized subject or national of a state, commonwealth, or other polity, either native or naturalized, having certain rights, privileges, or duties."¹³ My argument is not that this is the only definition of citizenship or that we cannot imagine terms as more pliable than their dictionary definitions suggest. But we cannot deny that this is the predominant understanding of citizenship, and we further cannot deny that this kind of citizenship is a product of modern state development and also of the colonial creation of national borders.¹⁴ Further, I dare say that even when we might be imagining discursive or cultural practices of citizenship or expressing concern about who is participating in the political, those holding legal status or seeking it are the ones to whom reference is primarily being made. If we both delimit the political as the realm of (various kinds of) citizens and also only imagine activist and civic practices as those of citizens, do we not preclude the lives, experiences, and practices of numerous collectives and individuals who have always engaged in practices that are justifiably called rhetorical *and* political, but that don't conform to this norm?

I believe the answer is an unequivocal yes! On its surface, McKerrow's review of Rhetoric's history and his ongoing concern with making Rhetoric more inclusive of alternative rhetorical practices may seem to have little to do with this discussion of citizenship. But it is precisely this disconnect that concerns me. Inquiry into the political rhetoric of U.S. citizens (i.e., demands for legal recognition, civic participation, the development and health of U.S. democracy, and inclusion within the nation-state) has predominated the field, and it is precisely the same concerns that preoccupy most of the scholars McKerrow deems salient in his reviews of Rhetoric's intellectual history.¹⁵ They have implicitly and explicitly privileged citizens' rhetorical practices and the rhetorical practices of citizenship. This means that even in those characterizations of the field's history aiming to challenge the orthodoxy, citizenship retains its privilege. So, what else, what instead, what next?

Why Not Inclusion?

Although it might seem apt to suggest that a solution to this problematic could be found in making the intellectual history of feminism "more accurate" and "more

inclusive,” I argue that women’s studies would be better served by critically interrogating its investments in and intentions with history.¹⁶

In his review of the discipline, McKerrow’s¹⁷ engagement with feminist rhetorical scholarship centers on the debate between Barbara Biesecker and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell which begins with Biesecker’s critique of Campbell’s rhetoric of inclusion as represented by her weighty two-volume collection, *Man Cannot Speak For Her*.¹⁸ These volumes include addresses written and spoken by women orators that have been left out of the predominantly white, male canon. This debate is a crucial one, but it also reflects a moment in Rhetoric’s intellectual history in which feminists hashed out their differences on the pages of a predominantly male journal, as male scholars watched without being implicated. Nevertheless, Biesecker won the intellectual argument, making the point I have been reiterating here: projects of inclusion don’t rupture oppressive structures; instead they uphold and reinforce those structures by showing how they can be kinder and gentler and better without actually changing much at all. This point is especially salient in Rhetoric since its history is a citizenship narrative.

Citizenship is the quintessential example of this kind of inclusionary process that serves not to transform structures, but to enhance them.¹⁹ In discussing the specific instances of amnesty and other expansions of citizenship’s parameters, Patchen Markell argues that such expansions are often viewed from a universalist perspective that emphasizes only their emancipatory potential. Such expansions are often restrictive for the newly included, even as they bolster the idea of a benign and sovereign state. Of course, disciplinary inclusion is not the same as national inclusion, yet all inclusionary logics seem to share the fact that they reinforce the existing structures and tend to obscure those structures’ flaws. Furthermore, inclusion also reinscribes the system in a way that makes posing alternatives to it or offering critiques of it much harder. But alternatives and critique are precisely what are necessary to counter the persistent reinscription of this narrative in Rhetoric.

A brief look at three key moments in our intellectual history that have attempted to rupture the normative structures of Rhetoric illustrates that projects of inclusion will not fundamentally change Rhetoric; however, posing alternative ontologies and epistemologies very well may. The three moments or, better yet, ruptures I want briefly to discuss issue from feminist scholars in Rhetoric: Lisa A. Flores, Olga Idriss Davis, and Sonja Foss and Cindy L. Griffin. Each of their essays published in the 1990s challenges inclusionary and citizenship narratives in compelling ways while still offering insightful and uniquely *rhetorical* theory.

A Rhetoric of Difference

Flores’ “Creating Discursive Space through a Rhetoric of Difference,” published in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, has been cited more than 100 times in the field, a feat that is unmatched by any other essay by a Latin@ rhetoric scholar. Flores’ essay suggests that many of the ways that we have attempted to understand meaningful rhetorical practice have not accounted for marginalized, particularly Chicana feminist

practices and perspectives. Flores does not maintain that Chicanas should simply be included in our understanding of rhetoric; instead, she reveals how, owing to their experience as border beings, Chicanas have developed their own unique rhetorical practices that defy any existing understandings in the Western canon. She states:

In addition to the need to blend form and content, the border experience also leads to the need to fuse public and private. While much of rhetorical history investigates the influence of discourse that is clearly public, such as speeches, for marginalized groups whose access to the public sphere has been limited, "private" discourse plays a public role.²⁰

Here, Flores does not merely ask that we emphasize the private as opposed to the public, but challenges the dichotomy between the two. Indeed, challenging deeply entrenched dichotomies is the key to this approach. Flores writes, "Chicana feminist rhetoric is by nature neither 'Western' nor nonwestern."²¹ Chicanas blend Mexican, white U.S. American, and indigenous perspectives in their creation of a rhetoric of difference and the development of their discursive space, bringing elements of nationalist and feminist beliefs into play, since both are central, while neither is sufficient to identify their experiences.

The specific process of developing discursive space that can operate as a home or homeland for Chicana feminists requires "becoming aware of existing definitions" of what it means to be Chicana created by the dominant group.²² It further necessitates "defining themselves independently of the dominant group" and celebrating their unique culture.²³ As Chicana feminists go through this process, they discover home, "in what Anzaldúa calls *'El Mundo Zurdo'*" or the left-handed world.²⁴ This space of queerness and alterity can never be purely distinct from the dominant perspective, but it is different. This rhetoric of difference and rhetorical theory of difference resituates the center of rhetorical practice and inquiry, and it recasts what is considered rhetorical. While Flores requests an acknowledgment of difference, neither she nor the Chicana feminists she writes about aspire to national identity or desire inclusion within U.S. political structures. The rhetoric of difference and the Chicana homeland are not inclusionary, but alternative and transformative.

Violating a Space of Otherness

Davis' "A Black Woman as Rhetorical Critic" resonates with Flores' essay as she identifies "the ways in which the 'ordinariness' of Black women's lives shapes the contours of their rhetoric." Davis insists that it "is imperative to chart a direction for future scholarship,"²⁵ and she declares the necessity of validating the self and "violating a space of otherness" in order to challenge assumptions about who people are and to resist oppressive power relations.²⁶ The space of otherness is the space in which people, particularly those in power, are able to see themselves as other to another. For change to occur, that space must be violated in order to reveal "the 'other' within the 'self.'"²⁷ Davis relies on the experiences and voices of those most abjected—slave women. Like Flores, Davis indicates the importance of a unique space that is created by and for black women rhetorical critics so that there is space for the

work and also because such a space “simultaneously transforms the dominant discourses of theory and praxis.”²⁸ To reveal how such transformation works, Davis puts herself in direct conversation with one dominant theoretical discourse, postmodern approaches, including critical rhetoric. She claims that even in opening some spaces for marginalized perspectives, postmodernism “fail[s] to explicate the politics of a Black subjectivity and the nature of identity politics for Black and other oppressed groups.”²⁹ She writes:

Some critics suggest that “validating” a Black feminist approach to rhetorical criticism requires critics to locate ideas within existent rhetorical theory and then insert the ideas and experiences of Black women within these assumptions. Such a suggestion informs the prevailing hegemony of racism and sexism that is maintained within our academic institutions and scholarly avenues of innovative thought. It also points to the way in which a Black woman’s standpoint may be unsettling for those critics and scholars who are accustomed to having subordinate groups frame their ideas in ways that are convenient to the more powerful.³⁰

Refusing inclusion and declining to ask for recognition, here Davis validates herself and others like her on their own terms. As she puts it:

Black women’s rhetoric informs a new vision of what humanity *could be* should their lives find inclusion in the discourse of human communication. Writing became a symbolic act of redefining themselves in opposition to the dehumanizing images of Black women as breeders, chattel, and illiterate non-beings.³¹

Much like Flores argued, this new discursive space only is made available through rhetorical practice, practice that recognizes dominant discourses about Black women by redefining them in alternative terms. Even as Davis sometimes talks of inclusion, relying on slave narratives to animate her argument counters the citizenship narrative since slaves are the antithesis of citizens. The use of slave women’s narratives opens the way for alternative rhetoric and epistemologies, transforming rhetorical possibility.

Davis also writes against the grain of inclusionary rhetoric and norms of citizenship in her use of the metaphor of the kitchen table. Drawing on African American women’s conceptualization of womanist theory, a term originally coined by Alice Walker, Davis emphasizes the necessity of centering black women’s ways of doing and knowing. One way to do so is through understanding what she calls “the threat of the kitchen legacy,” the challenge the threat posed to “the hegemony of the white dominated dining room,” and how the threat of this legacy resurfaces in academic spaces (as overtones of racism and sexism construct black women’s academic lives and ability to teach and produce scholarship).³² During slave times, the kitchen was a key site of power relations between blacks and whites, particularly women. White women exerted power over black women in often horrific ways, but for black women the kitchen was also a space of creativity, power, and subversion.³³ The power that black women had in the kitchen was always a potential threat to the white household, something the slavemaster understood. This in part explains why, in the eighteenth century, kitchens were often built outside of plantation homes. The spatial distinction established clear hierarchical boundaries between slave and master:

slaves were literally and symbolically *outsiders*. Yet, the outside space also enabled the constitution of spaces of black women's authority, care, and creativity. Such a space was transformative in that it enabled black women's rhetorical invention and self-determination. While black women are similar outsiders to the academy, the "kitchen legacy" offers black women "a safe space for activism, for redefining, transforming, and reconstituting Academic spaces by providing a vision of transformation."³⁴ This view of resistance and transformation acknowledges that black women have to seek inclusion in white spaces such as the academy for material reasons, but that their creativity does not aim, ultimately, toward inclusion but, in fact, offers an alternative vision of Rhetoric altogether.

Invitational Rhetoric

Finally, I want to spend a moment on Griffin and Foss's very controversial and still-debated essay, "Invitational Rhetoric." The essay's limitations have been well laid out: their view of change has been criticized for its theory of agency, and their feminism has been duly censured for its white, middle-class, U.S.-centric, and heterosexual bias.³⁵ Others also have taken issue with Griffin and Foss's reductive representations of traditional rhetoric, their limited understanding of control, and the overall implication of their argument: namely, that we all had been not only participating in something violent, but also advocating for its value and how to be better at doing it.³⁶ Although I agree with some, but certainly not all, of these critiques, none of them, in my view, renders the essay worthy of complete dismissal. I hold this view because Griffin and Foss challenge the field's founding concept while not rejecting it entirely: persuasion. They write, "Although we believe that persuasion is often necessary, we believe an alternative exists that may be used in instances when changing and controlling others is not the rhetor's goal."³⁷ They further note:

Our goal in offering this theory [of invitational rhetoric] is to expand the array of communicative options available to all rhetors and to provide an impetus for more focused and systematic efforts to describe and assess rhetoric in all of its manifestations.³⁸

In other words, this essay did not seek to dismiss altogether what so many hold sacred but, instead, to point out how it might be ethically flawed and to show how there are other ways of being in the rhetorical world. In so doing, Foss and Griffin offer two rhetorical forms that differ from persuasion: "offering perspectives" and the "creation of external conditions that allow others to present their perspectives in an atmosphere of respect and equality."³⁹ This latter point requires "safety, value, and freedom" for all involved.⁴⁰ In both instances, what Foss and Griffin define as rhetorical practice may not even be recognized as rhetorical by the traditional orthodoxy. In this way, invitational rhetoric at its core offers a systemic critique and an alternative framework. The authors go as far as to claim, "Invitational rhetoric thus may transform an oppressive system precisely because it does *not engage that system on its own terms, using arguments developed from the system's framework or orientation.*"⁴¹

This contribution is especially important when read alongside Griffin's critiques of the essentialist roots of the public sphere. In her important essay, Griffin reveals how the concept of the public sphere, the arena in which so much persuasive communication takes place and the centerpiece of Western democracy, emerges from a belief in the separation of the sexes into two distinct spheres: private or domestic and public or political.⁴² In this way, the reliance on and celebration of the public sphere not only reifies this essentialist distinction, but also suggests that the very operations of democratic communication reify it. Thus, invitational rhetoric intervenes, not by asking to be included in that public sphere, but by suggesting an alternative to its modalities.

Conclusions

These three essays, which are often missing completely from or mentioned only in passing in definitive historical accounts, together offer a different engagement with Rhetoric's intellectual history and pose an alternative to the citizenship narrative that underwrites it.⁴³ Part of the reason why essays such as these are not included is that the challenge they pose to the inclusionary narrative exposes the problems with the narrative as it is typically construed, revealing a rhetorical world that sees agency, power, and the political in different terms altogether. Furthermore, such essays throw into question the value of historical assessments by disclosing their narrative or mythic status. These essays also help to illuminate the logics that are at work to keep a particular narrative in place. Further, when one turns away from historical assessments or the crafting of intellectual histories and toward the place where such narratives are performed or enacted—in course curricula—such historical entrenchment becomes even more transparent. As Malea Powell duly noted during a panel at the 2014 Rhetoric Society of America conference on rhetorical theory and history curriculum in courses across the United States, we all know very well our field's canon. We all teach the same primary texts and anthologies in our courses, and we frame anything that is not Eurocentric as "marginal." But what if we could reframe our relationship to our disciplinary history and to the canon altogether by acknowledging the narratives that predominate as well as what that dominance implies? How might such a reframing work to challenge the manner in which projects of inclusion both preoccupy rhetorical scholars and characterize the way we try to account for that which has been excluded, a project that has concerned scholars like McKerrow for decades? Perhaps the essays I have considered here do not deliver all of the answers, but they certainly provide an invaluable point of departure.

Notes

- [1] Raymie E. McKerrow, "Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric: A Site for Rhetoric's Future," *Southern Communication Journal* 63, no. 4 (1998): 315.
- [2] E.g., Olga Idriss Davis, "A Black Woman as Rhetorical Critic: Validating Self and Violating the Space of Otherness," *Women's Studies in Communication* 21, no. 1 (1998): 77–90; Marouf

- Hasian Jr. and Fernando Pedro Delgado, "The Trials and Tribulations of Racialized Critical Rhetorical Theory: Understanding the Rhetorical Ambiguities of Proposition 187," *Communication Theory* 8, no. 3 (1998): 245–70; Charles E. Morris III, ed. *Queering Public Address: Sexualities in American Historical Discourse* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007); Raka Shome, "Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An 'Other' View," *Communication Theory* 6, no. 1 (1996): 40–59; Darrel Allan Wanzer, "Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting McGee's Fragmentation Thesis through Decoloniality," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 647–57.
- [3] Amy L. Brandzel, "Haunted by Citizenship: Whitenormative Citizen-Subjects and the Uses of History in Women's Studies," *Feminist Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011): 505.
- [4] Kenneth Rufo and R. Jarrod Atchison, "From Circus to Fasces: The Disciplinary Politics of Citizen and Citizenship," *Review of Communication* 11, no. 3 (2011): 195.
- [5] "From Circus to Fasces," 199.
- [6] "From Circus to Fasces," 203.
- [7] "From Circus to Fasces," 208.
- [8] "From Circus to Fasces," 208.
- [9] Karma R. Chávez, *Queer Migration Politics: Activist Rhetoric and Coalitional Possibilities* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013).
- [10] Aihwa Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States," *Current Anthropology* 37, no. 5 (1996): 737–62.
- [11] Renato Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship and Educational Democracy," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 402–11; Toby Miller, *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and the Postmodern Subject* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
- [12] "citizenship, n." OED Online. June 2014. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/33521?redirectedFrom=citizenship&> (accessed June 20, 2014).
- [13] "citizen, n. and adj." OED Online. June 2014. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/33513> (accessed June 20, 2014).
- [14] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Jenna M. Loyd, Matt Mitchelson, and Andrew Burridge, eds., *Beyond Walls and Cages: Prisons, Borders, and Global Crisis* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012).
- [15] A reader can visit McKerrow's reference lists to see the scholars he centers in his historical reviews. Certainly, these scholars are vast and varied in their approach to rhetorical theory and in their subjects of study. Nonetheless, to take one example, even just a glance at the scholars of social movement emphasized in "Research in Rhetoric," it is clear that scholars such as Griffin, McGee, Zarefsky, Lucas, Cathcart, Andrews, and Simons devote much of their scholarly attention to citizen-based movements in the United States.
- [16] Brandzel, "Haunted by Citizenship," 505.
- [17] Raymie E. McKerrow, "Research in Rhetoric: A Glance at Our Recent Past, Present, and Potential Future," *Review of Communication* 10, no. 3 (2010): 205.
- [18] He also mentions the debate over "Disciplining the Feminine," but does not give sustained attention to the arguments or the implications for rhetoric's intellectual history. See: Carol Blair, Julie R. Brown, and Leslie A. Baxter, "Disciplining the Feminine," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80, no. 4 (1994): 383–403.
- [19] Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- [20] Lisa A. Flores, "Creating Discursive Space through a Rhetoric of Difference: Chicana Feminists Craft a Homeland," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 82, no. 2 (1996): 145.
- [21] Flores, "Creating Discursive Space," 145.
- [22] Flores, "Creating Discursive Space," 147.
- [23] Flores, "Creating Discursive Space," 149.
- [24] Flores, "Creating Discursive Space," 151.

- [25] Davis, "Black Woman," 78.
- [26] Davis, "Black Woman," 86.
- [27] Davis, "Black Woman," 87.
- [28] Davis, "Black Woman," 79.
- [29] Davis, "Black Woman," 82.
- [30] Davis, "Black Woman," 82.
- [31] Davis, "Black Woman," 85, emphasis in original.
- [32] Olga Idriss Davis, "In the Kitchen: Transforming the Academy through Safe Spaces of Resistance," *Western Journal of Communication* 63, no. 3 (1999): 366.
- [33] Davis, "In the Kitchen," 367.
- [34] Davis, "In the Kitchen," 378.
- [35] E.g., Nina M. Lozano-Reich and Dana L. Cloud, "The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality," *Western Journal of Communication* 73, no. 2 (2009): 220–26.
- [36] E.g., Celeste Michelle Condit, "In Praise of Eloquent Diversity: Gender and Rhetoric as Public Persuasion," *Women's Studies in Communication* 20, no. 2 (1997): 91–116.
- [37] Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric," *Communication Monographs* 62, no. 1 (1995): 5.
- [38] Foss and Griffin, "Invitational Rhetoric," 5.
- [39] Foss and Griffin, "Invitational Rhetoric," 7.
- [40] Foss and Griffin, "Invitational Rhetoric," 10.
- [41] Foss and Griffin, "Invitational Rhetoric," 17, emphasis mine.
- [42] Cindy L. Griffin, "The Essentialist Roots of the Public Sphere: A Feminist Critique," *Western Journal of Communication* 60, no. 1 (1996): 21–39.
- [43] Even Michaela Meyer's essay on forty years of feminist contributions only mentions Flores and Foss and Griffin. Davis has been effectively erased. Michaela D. E. Meyer, "Women Speak(ing): Forty Years of Feminist Contributions to Rhetoric and an Agenda for Feminist Rhetorical Studies," *Communication Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (2007): 1–17.

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